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THE COLORADO SECURITIES LAW
By ERNEST AIV. LOHr
Ernest W. Lohf received his A.B. degree from Harvard University in 1950 and
his LL.B. degree from Harvard Law School in 1953. He was admitted to
practice in Colorado in 1956; is a partner in the Denver firm of Keller,
Bloomenthal & Lohf and a member of the Denver, Colorado and American
Bar Associations.
Generally speaking, securities regulation in Colorado has as its
statutory base Chapter 125 of the Colorado Revised Statutes, which in-
chides the Securities Law,' the Fraudulent Practice Law,' the Anti-bucket-
ing Law' and other provisions relating to investment contracts' and
false statements regarding the value of securities.' An exhaustive analy-
sis would extend to certain other statutory provisions which, at least
formally, pertain to non-securities matters, e g., insurance." This article
is limited, however, to the Securities Law.
SOsIME PREIIMINARY OBSERVATIONS
The Securities Law must be viewed from a realistic perspective
placing it in the national context of securities regulation. At the federal
level the principal landmark is, of course, the Securities Act of 1933,"
administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission. The federal
regulation (in theory, entirely; as a practical matter, one may have reser-
vations) is based on the so-called disclosure philosophy: any and every
security, even the utterly worthless, may be offered and sold if all facts
material to an intelligent investment decision are completely and ac-
curately disclosed to prospective purchasers.' It is of considerable prac-
tical significance that the federal regulation is generally uniforma through-
out the country and has a centralized administration. The attorney at-
tempting to comply with the federal act ordinarily deals with at mtost
two offices: the \'\ashington, 1). C., office of the SEC and one of its
regional offices.
In contrast, securLities regulation at the state level" ranges from none
of significance in Nevada and Delaware" through relatively simple
regulatory systems (e.g., New York" and New Jersey'1) providing for
Colo. Rev. Star. §§ 125-1-1 to -19 (Supp. 1957).
2 1d. §§ 125-2-1 to -15.
:1 Id. §§ 125-6-1 to -8.
4 Id. §§ 125-3-1 to -6.
5 Id. §§ 125-5-1 and -2.5
Id. §§ 72-1-44.
48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1952), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
9§ 77b-77v (Supp. IV, 1957).
"Congress did not take away from the citizen 'his inalienable right to make a
fool of himself.' It simply attempted to prevent others from making a fool of him."
Loss, Securities Regulation 82 (1951).
The most recent, and the best, discussion of state securities legislation is Loss
and Cowett, Blue Sky Law (1958), which also contains a bibliography of blue sky
literature and lists of blue sky cases, both arranged by states.
10 A one-sentence anti-fraud statute of 1931, Del. Rev. Code § 4369 (1935), was
omitted from Delaware Code 1953.
"1 N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. Art. 23-A, § 352. The New York statutes also impose rela-
tively simple filing requirements, in effect elementary forms of dealer and securities
registration, as an adjunct to the anti-fraud provisions. Id. § 359-e. See note 13 infra.
"2 N.J. Rev. Stat., Tit. 49 (1937).
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enforcement of anti-fraud statutes by the state attorney general,- to
highly complex, often vigorously enforced, paternalistic administrative
mechanisms (e.g., California'") providing for detailed supervision of:
fraudulent practices, registration of securities, licensing of dealers and
salesmen and civil liabilities."' Insofar as states have developed systems
of securities regulation and, in particular, registration of securities, the
underlying philosophy is almost universally the so-called regulatory.
philosophy: it is the prerogative, indeed the duty, of the state securities
administrator to determine, on the basis of generally vague statutory
standards, " which proposed public offerings have merit (and therefore
can be permitted to be offered and sold) and which have none or not
enough (and therefore must be prohibited from ever reaching the mar-
ket place) . Disclosure of all material facts to prospective investors is,
of itself, insufficient to make the offer and sale of securities lawful.
The attorney attempting to blue sky an offering must, of course,
assume the risk that such judgment as to value or nerit by one or more
state administrators will be something less than adequate. In addition,
he must cope with practical problems stemming from widespread vari-
ations from state to state in definitions of basic terms (e.g., "security"
1' Anti-fraud provisions, as such, do not require filings with, or the securing of
permits from, a state official; they merely authorize official action (investigation,
injunction and prosecution) in connection with apparently fraudulent conduct.
14 Cal. Corp. Code, Tit. 4. Div. 1. as amended by L. 1957, c. 139, 169, 170, 669.
'5 State blue sky legislation generally exemplifies one or more of three basic regu-
latory techniques: (1) regulation of fraudulent practices independently of any licens-
ing system; (2) registration, licensing and supervision of broker-dealers and other
persons engaged in the securities businss; and (3) registration of securities. A few
states adopt only one or two of the three basic techniques. The typical blue sky law,
however, contains all types of provisions. E.g., Uah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-7, -15, -17,
-24 (1953).
16 The standards are commonly so broadly phrased that the state administrator's
power to approve or disapprove of an offering, or to impose conditions precedent to
the granting of a permit, has no limitations of practical significance. Thus the Cali-
fornia Commissioner must find that the "proposed plan of business . . . and the pro-
posed issuance of securities are fair, just, and equitable, that the applicant intends
to transact its business fairly and honestly, and that the securities that it proposes
to issue and the method to be used by it in issuing or disposing of them are not such
as, in his opinion, will work a fraud upon the purchaser .... " Cal. Corp. Code, Tit. 4,
Div. 1, § 25507. Other standards include, in Utah, that the enterprise must not be
based on "unsound business principles" (Utah Code Ann. § 66-1-11 (1953)); in New
Mexico, that the Commissioner, after investigation of the condition of the issuer and
value of its securities, be "satisfied" that "the sale of such securities should be per-
mitted" (N.M. Stat. Ann. § 48-18-24 (1953)), with more specific standards governing
revocation of permits (ibid.).
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and "sale") ; in coverage of the acts and extent of exemptions; in appli-
cation forms (on which substantially the same information generally
Must be submitted) ; in statutory standards to be applied by adminis-
trators: in interpretation of identical statutory language; in the extent
to which substantially identical statutes are enforced; in unpublished,
ad hoc administrative rules of thumb and practices arising out of' exig-
encies of budget and manpower in a particular state; and in predilec-
tions of individual administrators?
The mere co-existence of diverse, technical federal and state securi-
ties laws, both imposing detailed and substantial filing requirements,
proclaims the necessity for uniformity of the state laws and their co-
ordination with the federal legislation. Nevertheless, progress toward
those goals has been slow." A new Uilor11 Securities Act,' " approved in
1956, represents the most promising attempt thus far to provide a work-
able solution to the uniformity-coordination problenm. The Act has been
favorably received in a number of states, including Colorado, and will
be considered in greater detail shortly.
HISTORY OF THE SlCURITIEs LAW
Colorado did not contribute to the flood of blue sky legislation
which soon followed enactment of the first thorough-going blue sky law
in Kansas in 1911.21 It was not until 1923 that the Colorado legislators
enacted "The Securities Act,"" which to a very great extent is identical
with the present statute. The fact that Colorado did not climb on the
blue sky bandwagon until 1923 is not particularly remarkable, but it is
significant that the Colorado legislation represented a departure from
the regulatory philosophy which already had become the traditional
approach of securities legislation in the various states.
The 1923 Act provided no statutory merit standards which had to
be satisfied prior to offer and sale of securities, nor did it require that
any permit be obtained prior to an offer or sale. The heart of the Act
'7 "No two state acts are identical. And the amount of variation and frequently
unnecessary complexity in both substance and verbiage is staggering. For example,
when all the permutations are charted, there are some 2800 exemptions in the forty-
seven statutes." Loss and Cowett, Blue Sky Law 18-19 (1958); see also pp. 35-36,
43-46, 62-64, 67-83.
18 A Uniform Sale of Securities Act, 9 U.L.A. 65, approved by the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association
in 1929, became outdated with passage of the Federal Securities Act of 1933 and never
was enacted to any substantial extent (see Loss, Securities Regulation 45 (1951 with
1955 Supp.)). The National Association of Securities Administrators subsequently
secured adoption in some states of uniform application and other forms (id. 45-46).
Until recently, however, the most important contribution was enactment in a number
of states of provisions permitting the filing of an SEC registration statement or
prospectus in lieu of information required under state law, e.g.. Ariz. Rev. Stal.
§ 44-1896 (1956) (federal prospectus or offering circular may be accepted in lieu of
state prospectus upon finding "nature and scop'e of the information disclosed" is
-substantially equivalent'). And ordinarily state administrators are cooperative in
informally permitting questions on state forms to be answered by cross-reference
to a federal registration statement, prospectus, or offering circular. Despite the .fore-
going contributions toward iniformity and coordination, however, the basic problem
is far from solved.
1" 9C U.L.A. 86 (1957); Loss and Cowett, Blue Sky Law 245 (1958).
20 Kan. L. 1911, c 133. The Kansas statute, both in its original and present form,
is an example par excellence of the strict regulatory approach to securities registra-
tion designed to shield "gullible, unsophisticated investors" from "slick promotional
schemes." During the period 1911 to 1913, 23 states enacted blue sky laws, all but six
of which were identical with the Kansas statute or modeled upon it. See Loss and
Cowett. Blue Sky Law 10 (1958).
21 Colo. Laws 1st Reg. Sess. 1923, c. 16S.
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was section 4: "Every issuer of securities, within twelve (12) months
next before selling or offering for sale, any security or securities, . . .
shall issue a prospectus ... containing specified inlformation. Section
6 required two copies of such "prospectus" to be filed with the Secretary
of State. Section 7 required that advertisements and selling literature
''shall contain a reference to this Act, and shall mention the date of the
prospectus and the fact that such prospectus, relating to the securities
offered, has been filed in accordance with the terms hereof and is open
to public inspection," and shall include an offer to send, to any person
requesting same, a copy of such prospectus by mail." Section 8 pro-
vided for civil liabilities and included the following provision: "Every
person acquiring any security offered to the public, upon compliance
with the provisions of this Act, shall be deemed to rely upon all, and
only, such representations and statements as are set forth in the pros-
pectus relating to such security." The statute by its terms embodied the
disclosure, as opposed to the regulatory, philosophy later exemplified
in greater detail in the Federal Securities Act of 1933. The Colorado
statute is unique among blue sky laws in adopting the disclosure ap-
proach to registration of securities generally.-"
In 1931 the Colorado legislature enacted the Fraudulent Practice
Act,2' in effect a supplement to the 1923 legislation, containing provi-
sions for registration of dealers and salesmen and anti-fraud provisions.
The 1931 Act also amplified the information to be included in prospec-
tuses filed under the Securities Act, required the filing of a supplemental
prospectus upon any substantial change of material fact, and made it
the duty of the issuer to deliver a copy of the prospectus to persons mak-
ing written request therefor. A 1953 amendment of the Securities Act
furthered federal-siate coordination by authorizing issuance, publication
and circulation of a preliminary prospectus or identifying statement
filed under the Securities Act of 1933.22 After further minor amendment
22 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 125-1-17 (Supp. 1957) now provides: "It shall be unlawful to
)rint in any solicitation, advertisement, letter, message, postcard, circular, pamphlet,
newspaper or periodical wherein any security is tendered, directly or indirectly, for
sale or delivery, or wherein any subscription or order for any security is solicited
any mention or reference to the fact that any registration statement has been filed
as required by 'The Securities Law,' unless immediately following such statement.
and in type at least as large as the type used in printing such statement, there be
printed the following: 'Such filing is not an approval, recommendation or guaranty
of such security by the state of Colorado or any of its officials.' " Further, § 125-1-16
makes it unlawful "to print upon any security any statement that the registration
statement or any document required by 'The Securities Law' has been filed .... "
25 Some states have adopted the disclosure approach in a piecemeal fashion as to
certain securities only. In 1903 Connecticut established a rudimentary disclosure-type
form of registration of mining and oil securities (Conn. Pub. Acts 1903-05, c. 196)
which was replaced by a regulatory-type statute in 1911 (Conn. Pub. Acts 1911, c.
232). Nevada (which today has no blue sky law) followed suit in 1909 with a statute
requiring filing of information relating to mining securities (Nev. Stat. 1909, c. 56),
later watered down in 1911 (Nev. Stat. 1911, c. 202) and repealed in 1915 (Nev. Stat.
1915, c. 49). The Idaho statute, basically of the regulatory type, does not apply to
issuers "engaged in actual mining operations developing mining property within the
state," the term "actual mining operations' excluding "development or production
of gas or oil," (Idaho Code § 26-1916 (1947)) and special disclosure-type provisions
(id. §§ 26-1817 to -21) apply to such exempted mining issuers. Similarly, the Wash-
ington "Mining Act," Wash. Rev. Code, c. 21.08 (1951) (applying to any "corporation
engaged or proposing to engage in the metalliferous mining industry and desiring to
issue or sell . . . securities issued by it, to more than twenty residents of the
state . ," id. § 21.08.020) and the "Oil and Mining Leases Act," id. c. 21.12 appli-
cable to mining leases ("any instrument conveying title to . . . metalliferous, or non-
metalliferous rights or real property, exclusive of title to the property," id. § 21.12.010)
and their public sale ("an offering of three or more leases to residents of the state."
ibid.), embody the disclosure philosophy in contrast to the Washington general, regu-
latory-type blue sky law, the "Securities Act." id. c. 21.04.
24 Colo. Laws 1st Reg. Sess. 1931, c. 95.
25 Colo. Laws 1st Reg. Sess. 1953. c. 214.
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in 1955,' the Securities Act was last amended in 1957. The 1957
amendment supplied the present name, "The Securities Law," and en-
acted a significant portion of the latest Uniform Securities Act.
THE UNIFORM SECURITIEs ACT
At the request of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws, Harvard Law School in 1954 began a two-year, inten-
sive study of state securities regulation, conducted by Professor Louis
Loss and Edward M. Cowett. The results were two: a new Uniform
Securities Act" and a treatise by Messrs. Loss and Cowett, "Blue Sky
Law."
Part I of' the new Uniform Act covers fraudulent and other pro-
hibited practices: Part 11 provides [1- registration ol broker-dealers,
agents and investment a(visors; Part I II covers registration of securities;
and Part IV sets forth provisions of general ap)plical)ility. The different
parts of the Act reflect a basic classification of' existing laws, provisions
contained therein and regulatory techniques into (a1) regulation of
fraudulent practices independently of any licensing system, (b) regis-
tration, licensing and Supervision of broker-dealers and other persons
engaged in the securities business, and (c) registration of securities.
The Act makes no provision, however, for disclosure-type registration.
The Act adopts a novel approach: in a general way it is a restatement of
" Colo. L1aws 1st leg. Sess. 1955. c. 285.
21 Colo. 1aws 1st Deg. Sess. 1957, c. 243.
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Iexisting law, the separate parts of which can be enacted alone or in any
combination. The rationale of that approach is that absolute uniformity
is an impractical goal where existing legislation to such a very great
extent is characterized by diversity both in detail and basic regulatory
techniques. "
Part III of the Uniform Act, relating to registration of securities, is,
of course, of particular interest here. Three registration procedures are
219 See Loss and Cowett, Blue Sky Law 236 (1958). Appendices A, B and C to the
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established: notification, " coordination " and qualification.- Part III
is an excellent illustration of the general approach of the draftsmen, who,
although attempting wherever practicable to adhere to and unify exist-
ing law, nevertheless did not "limit themselves to discovering the cow-
paths and following them."3 3 Registration of securities by notification
or qualification was, to a considerable extent, characteristic of existing
legislation at the time the Act was drafted."4 The former is essentially
a simplified type of registration available only to "high-quality" offer-
ings;" the latter is a detailed, "long-form" type registration available for
any security." Registration by coordination, however, is a statutory in-
novation and provides a simplified registration procedure for any security
as to which a registration statement has been filed under the Securities
Act of 1933 in connection with the same offering."
Under the registration by coordination procedure, the state filing
consists merely of three copies of the prospectus and amendments filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission under the Securities Act
of 1933, and, if requested by the state administrator, copies of other doc-
uments and information so filed, together with an undertaking to for-
ward all amendments of the federal registration statement promptly.
The state registration becomes effective at the moment the federal regis-
tration statement becomes effective if (1) no stop order or other pro-
ceeding under state law is pending, (2) the state registration statement
30 § 302 (9C U.L.A. 101 (1957)).
31 § 303 (9C U.L.A. 104 (1957)).
32 § 304 (9C U.L.A. 107 (1957)).
33 Loss and Cowett, Blue Sky Law 237 (195S).
31 Twenty-five statutes then provided for registration by notification (sometimes
called "description") and qualification (or "application"). Loss and Cowett, Blue Sky
Law 286 (1958).
35 The Arizona requirements for registration by descripton are as typical as any:
the issuer must have been in continuous operation for at least three years and for
three of the five years immediately prior to registration must have had annual net
earnings (1) in case of interst-bearing securities, not less than 115 times annual
interest thereon and on all interest-bearing securities of equal rank, (2) in case of
securities having a specified dividend rate, not less than 11h times annual dividend
requirements thereon and on all outstanding securities of equal rank, and (3) in case
of other securities, not less than 5% upon all outsttnding securities of equal rank,
including those propcsed to be offered. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-1871 (1956).
36 E.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 44-1891 to -1900 (1956).
37 The draftsmen consider the provisions for registration by coordination as "per-
haps the most important reform in the entire statute." Loss and Cowett, Blue Sky
Law 242 (1958). And if legislative results are a valid indication that judgment is
sound; for the registration by coordination provisions thus far apparently have been
2'eceived more favorably than any other portion of the new Act. They have beer,
enacted in substance or verbatim in Colorado (Colo. Rev. Stat. § 125-1-4(1) (Supp.
1957)), Hawaii (Hawaii Rev. L. § 199-8 (1955)), Kansas (Kan. L. 1957, S.B. No. 145.
§ 6). New Mexico (N. M. Stat. Ann. § 48-18-19(B) (Supp. 1957)), Texas (Tex. L. 1957,
S.13. No. 294, § 7(C) and Virginia (Va. Code 1950 § 13.1-509 as amended by Laws 1956
c. 428), although New Mexico omits the automatic effectiveness provision. Certainly
registration by coordination is a very substantial step toward effective federal-state
coordination. But the same or a. simila1 ' procedure well could have been extended to
securities offered under the federal Regulation A (17 C.F.R. § 230, 251-62 (Supp. 1957))
even though admittedly Regulation A technically is an exemption from registration
under the Securities Act of 1933 and not in all respects the equivalent of registration
thereunder. Regulation A requirements have tended more and more, as a practical
matter, to become tantamount to registration. The information available to investors,
and to state administrators, from a Regulation A offering circular tends to be sub-
stantially the same as would be available from a registration statement prospectus
without exhibits; and the state administrator still has ample authority to require
additional information. And a number of state statutes before advent of the new
Uniform Securities Act permitted a. federal offering circular (apparently meaning a
Regulation A offering circular as distinguished from a registration statement pros-
pectus) to be filed under state law in lieu of information otherwise required by state
application forms, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-1896 (1956).
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has been on file at least ten days, and (3) a statement of the maximum
and minimum offering prices and underwriting discounts and commis-
sions has been on file with the state at least two days. 8
But registration by coordination does not in effect exempt from
state law securities for which a federal registration statement has been
filed. In this connection, it is particularly noteworthy that Part III of
the Uniform Securities Act proceeds upon the regulatory philosophy.
The other types of registration (notification and qualification) are tra-
ditionally found only in a regulatory-type statute involving application
to the offering by the state administrator of the particular merit stand-
ards recognized by state law. In Part III of the Act, section 306 (a),
which applies to all three types of registration, authorizes the adminis-
trator by order to deny, suspend or revoke effectiveness of any state regis-
tration upon finding (I) that the order is in the public interest and
(2) that any one of nine substantive grounds for such order exist. Such
substantive grounds "are a cross-section of the existing standards"" and
include " (E) the offering has worked or tended to worka fraud upon
purchasers or would so operate" and " (F) the offering has been or would
be made with unreasonable amounts of underwriters' and sellers' dis-
counts, commissions, or other compensation, or promoters' profits or
participation, or unreasonable amounts or kinds of options." With this
background, let us turn to the 1957 amendment of the Colorado statute.
3s § 303 (9C U.LA. 104 (1957)).
39 Loss and Cowett, Blue Sky Law 327 (1958).
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THE 1957 AMENDMENT
The 1957 amendment'" to "The Securities Act" changed its name to
"The Securities Law" and made another change in basic terminology:
the issuer no longer files a "prospectus" but instead files a "registration
statement." The latter change adopts the terminology of the Uniform
Securities Act.
The Colorado legislature also adopted verbatim the basic securities
registration requirement of the Uniform Act that "It is unlawful for any
person to offer or sell any security in this state unless it is registered . . .
or the security or transaction is exempt .... .'"' But Colorado added to
that requirement an additional sentence: "A security may be registered
by qualification or coordination."'' The addition would appear to indi-
cate that Colorado has accepted two of the registration procedures under
the Uniform Act-coordination and qualification-and has rejected the
third-notification. As will be noted later, however, the word "qualifi-
cation" has decidedly different connotations under the Colorado statute
than under the Uniform Act.
The 1957 Colorado amendments substantially adopt the registra-
tion by coordination provisions of the Uniform Act, the most significant
variation being that Colorado requires filing copies of the entire federal
registration statement, whereas the Uniform Act requires only, at least
for the initial filing, copies of the federal prospectus.' 3 Colorado also
added a provision empowering the securities commissioner by order sum-
marily to postpone or suspend effectiveness of the registration statement
"pending final determination of any proceeding under this section.""
The Uniform Act contains the identical provision, not in section 303
(the registration by coordination section), but in section 306 (provisions
applicable to all types of registration-qualification, notification or co-
ordination) .'"
Immediately following the provisions for registration by coordina-
tion, the Colorado Securities Law provides for registration by "qualifi-
cation."" As previously noted, registration by qualification prior to the
Uniform Act was a common procedure under regulatory-type blue sky
laws; and, except for the "blue-chip" securities for which registration
by notification (carrying with it automatic effectiveness) was available,
the "qualification" procedure implied that the securities sought to be
registered had to measure up to the merit standards set forth in the state
40 Colo. Laws 1st Reg. Sess. 1957, c. 243.
:1 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 125-1-4 (Supp. 1957); 9C U.L.A. 100 (1957).
" Colo. Rev. Stat. § 125-1-4 (Supp. 1957).
43 See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 125-1-5 (Supp. 1957) and § 303 (9C U.L.A. 104 (1957)) of
the Uniform Act.
44 Colo. Rev,. Stat. § 125-1-5(6) (Supp. 1957).
45 See 9C U.L.A. 118 (1957) and Commissioners' Note thereto. Section 306 also
explicitly refers to a "stop-order proceeding." That part of § 306 was not enacted in
Colorado, and "The Securities Law" contains no reference to a stop-order "proceed-
ing" as such (admittedly constitutional due process may require that some kind of
"proeeding" is implied in case of issuance of a stop order). The Colorado registration
by coordination provision refers to a "proceeding . . . pending under this article"
which might in turn refer only to § 125-1-13, providing for court "proceedings" by the
attorney-general and district attorneys.
46 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 125-1-6 (Supp. 1957).
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law involved." Undoubtedly the same concept of "qualification" is em-
bodied in the Uniform Act, which is basically a regulatory-type statute.
The Colorado provisions for registration by qualification have,
however, an entirely different flavor. There are no merit standards
enunciated in the Colorado statute; the commissioner need not find,
for example, whether the proposed offering and business are "fair, just
and equitable" or based on "sound business principles." Rather, sec-
tion 125-1-8"8 of the Colorado Revised Statutes states that the Colorado
securities commissioner, upon receipt of a filing under the Securities
Law, must determine "If the statements contained in such registration
statement . . . conform to the requirements of this article," i.e., whether
all information required to be set forth in the registration statement is
fully and properly presented. If so, he must, upon payment of the
proper filing fee, issue a receipt; and sales of securities presumably be-
come legal under section 125-1-4."
The registration by qualification provisions, to a considerable ex-
tent, are simply a re-enactment of prior law. The introductory clause"°
and the first fourteen items of information required to be set forth in
a registration statement by qualification"0 are substantially identical
with comparable pre-1957 provisions relating to "prospectuses.''  The
1957 amendment did, however, add to the information to be furnished
by including some of the registration by qualification provisions of
the Uniform Act requiring that there be furnished copies of any sales
literature intended to be used as of the effective date, an opinion of
counsel as to legality of the securities proposed to be offered, written
consents of experts (such as accountants and engineers) preparing or
certifying reports used in connection with the registration statement,
47 See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
48 Supp. 1957.
40 What is the effect, however. of the last sentence of § 125-1-6 (Supp. 1957) (the
registration by qualification provisions): "A registration statement under this section
becomes effective when the commissioner so orders." Does that sentence vest in the
commissioner, even after a determination that a registration statement contains all
information as required by the statute, discretion to deny or postpone effectiveness?
It is probably sufficient to answer that nowhere in the statute are there any stand-
ards, express or implied, by which such discretion is to be exercised; that to allow
it is to allow an "unconfined and vagrant" (see Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 295
U.S. 495, 551 (1935)) administrative discretion with no limitations other than the
commissioner's personal predilections as to which securities should be offered. Such
interpretation probably implies unconstitutionality of the Securities Law (see Prouty
v. Heron, 127 Colo. 168, 255 P.2d 755 (1952)) and should be rejected if any other con-
stitutional interpretation is reasonable. Interpretation of that sentence as only
authorizing the commisssioner, when the disclosure requirements of the statute have
been satisfied, to order the registration statement effective is not only more reason-
able (in view of absence of statutory standards relating to any further discretion)
but is more in accord with the fact that most provisions of the pre-1957 statute,
which was clearly a disclosure statute, were re-enacted by the 1957 legislation. That
interpretation apparently was adopted by the Colorado Attorney General in a recent
opinion that the securities commissioner has no discretion to refuse registration
because of past violations of the securities law, assuming the registration statement
otherwise complies with the statute. See Colo. Atty. Gen. Opinion, July 1, 1958, CCH
Blue Sky L. Rep. V 70,386.
5 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 125-1-6(1) (a) (Supp. 1957).
5I1d. §§ 125-1-6(1)(b) through -(o). Among the information which must be sub-
mitted is the following: name and address of issuer and details as to its organization:
location of business and proposed business: names, addresses and occupations of
officers, directors, and persons performing similar functions; nature of business or
proposed business; information as to capital structure of issuer and description of
securities; details as to how capital has been paid in; amount of the proposed issue
and use of proceeds tireof: details as to organization and promotion of issuers who
have not carried on business for more than three years, together with amounts paid
or payable to any person in connection with sale of securities; information as to
securities issued or to be issued for non-cash considerations; information as to ven-
dors of property proposed to be purchased with proceeds of the offering: and details
as to securities issued for intangible considerations.
51 See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 125-1-4 (1953).
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and such additional information as the commissioner may require by
rule or order."
The 1957 legislation made many relatively insignificant changes in
the prior law which cannot be examined in detail here. However, one
other facet of the 1957 enactment should be noted. The pre-1957 law
simply empowered the securities commissioner "to administer and en-
force any and all provisions of this article .. "" The authority of the
securities commissioner is now spelled out in considerably greater detail,
and, in addition to the foregoing general statement, the statute specific-
ally authorizes the commissioner to make "public or private investiga-
tions within or outside of this state as he deems necessary to determine
whether any person has violated or is about to violate any provisions of
this article or any rule or order hereunder. ... and authorizes him to
"publish information concerning any violation of this article or any rule
or order hereunder.""5 Further, the 1957 legislation granted to the com-
missioner an administrative subpoena power." The foregoing additions
to the administrative and investigative power of the commissioner again
illustrate the impact of the Uniform Act." The commissioner's power to
make "all necessary rules and regulations required to carry this article
into effect" was not, however, amplified by the 1957 amendment. 8
COVERAGE AND EXEMPTIONS
As previously noted, the basic securities registration requirement of
the securities law is all-inclusive and applies to any offer or sale of any
security by any person unless an exemption is available." Ascertaining
whether an "offer" or "sale" or a "security" is involved and, if so, whether
an exemption is available, is therefore of considerable practicable im-
portance upon any disposition of a security by any person.
"Offer," "Sale" and "Security"
The term "security" has a statutory definition and "means any
note, bond, debenture, collateral trust certificate, stock, treasury stock,
investment contract, transferable certificate of interest or participation
in a profit sharing agreement, certificate of interest in any oil, gas or
53 See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 125-1-6(1)(p) through -(t) (Supp. 1957) and § 304(b)(12)
through -(17) (9C U.L.A. 110) (1957)) of the Uniform Act.
6' Colo. Rev. Stat. § 125-1-17 (1953).
55 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 125-1-19(2) (Supp. 1957). Probably no other area of commer-
cial activity is so sensitive to adverse publicity indicative of illegality as is the secu-
rities industry. A few newspaper headlines are, if anything, even more effective in
squelching a public offering or proposed public offering than an administrative stop
order. Even if it later be shown that the publicity was entirely unjustified, the issuer
ordinarily will find that the taint of illegality survives exoneration therefrom and
that the offering will be ostracized by brokers and customers alike. In view of the
foregoing, does "authority to publish any information concerning any violation . . ."
confer on the securities commissioner a discretionary power to publish information as
to what he merely believes to be a violation? Is it sufficient for such belief to be
reasonable or based on probable cause? Or must there have been a prior administra-
tive or judicial proceeding in which the fact of violation has been established after
hearing? Note that the same statutory section also authorizes "public investigations,"
which presumably would not involve a violation previously established. See also the
official comment and draftsmen's commentary to the Uniform Act In Loss and
Cowett, Blue Sky Law 385 (1958) and section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1952), dealing with substantially identical or similar pro-
visions.
56 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 125-1-19(3) (Supp. 1957).
5 The added provisions, with some modification, are identical with §§ 407(a)
through -(c) of the Uniform Act, 9C' U.L.A. 135-136 (1957).
fs See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 125-1-11 (1953) and id. (Supp. 1957).
50Colo. Rev. Stat. § 125-1-4 (Supp. 1957).
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mining lease or title, certificate of beneficial interest in or title to prop-
erty or profits, or any other instrument commonly known as a security. ""
The breadth and scope of the foregoing definition is obviously
great, with the term "investment contract" serving as a sort of catch-all.
It may be noteworthy, however, that there is no reference, at least ex-
plicitly, to pre-organization subscriptions and warrants, options or rights
to subscribe to a security. "1 Even the latter, however, may be included
within the meaning of the phrase "any other instrument commonly
known as a security.""2
The terms "offer" and "sale" are not defined as such. The securities
law does specify, however, "unlawful acts" which delineate the conduct
prohibited without registration. As a practical matter, the specifications
of unlawful acts are equivalent to definitions of "offer" and "sale" for
many purposes.
Under section 125-1-3"' of the Colorado Revised Statutes, it is an
unlawful act, without antecedent registration within the preceding
twelve months, to sell, offer, or solicit from the public the subscription
or purchase of any security, or to contract "for the future sale to the
general public of any security"; to advertise"0 or to contract for the ad-
vertising of any security to the public; to issue, publish, or circulate any
literature intended to tender securities for sale or delivery, or to solicit
or procure subscriptions for or sales of securities. In this connection, a
security is deemed to be offered for sale to the general public if it is
advertised for sale in any manner or "Where the persons solicited in
this state in any calendar year by any other means to buy shall exceed
twenty-five in number.""5
The statutory language specifying unlawful acts would appear in
some manner to cover most attempts publicly to dispose of a security
for Value. But questions arise which could be best settled by specific
statutory definitions of terms such as "offer" and "sale." For example,
in what sense, if at all, do the registration requirements of the Securities
Law apply to the following: (1) conversion privileges whereby one
60 d. § 125-1-2(2).
6'Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 125-1-15(16) and -(17) (Supp. 1957) exempt certain pre-
organization certificate or subscription transactions and certain rights offerings to
stockholders.
6 For discussions of the meaning of the term "security" and its statutory defi-
nitions generally, see Loss, Securities Regulation 299-329 (1951 with 1955 Supp.);
Loss and Cowett, Blue Sky Law 349-352 (1958).
6S Supp. 1957.
any advertising medium who knowingly permits advertisement of unregistered secu-
rities shall be prosecuted as a violator of the Securities Law. The effect is that
possible criminal liability of the publisher of a newspaper or advertising medium is
not limited to liability as an aider or abettor.
6' Section 125-1-3(d) further provides that any person publishing a newspaper or
65 If the persons solicited in any calendar year are less than twenty-five in num-
ber, does it follow that the offering is not public? Probably not, particularly if under-
writers, salesmen and other trappings of a public offering are present. And, in calcu-
lating the number of persons solicited, apparently both residents and nonresidents
had to be included prior to the 1957 amendments. See Colo. Atty. Gen. Opinions,
April 30 and Oct. 14, 1948, CCH Blue Sky L. Rep. 70,072 and V] 70,081. The pre-1957
statute provided that a security would be deemed to be publicly offered, -Where the
persons solicited by any other means to buy shall exceed fifty in number." Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 125-1-16(3) (1953). The present language is: "Where the persons solicited in
this state in any calendar year by any other means to buy shall exceed twenty-five
in number.- id. § 125-1-16(3) (Supp. 1957).
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security is convertible into another; (2) warrants or rights to subscribe
to securities; (3) gifts of warrants; (4) gifts of assessable stock; (5)
dividends involving choice of cash dividend or stock dividend; (6) ex-
changes or distributions of securities pursuant to merger, consolidationj
corporate sale of assets or corporate reorganization? Ambiguities are
particularly likely to be troublesome when warrants, options and con-
version rights are involved." For example, if a cor)oration issues capital
stock of one class with warrants attached permitting purchase of addi-
tional shares of the same or another class, how many securities must be
registered and when? Is the result different if the warrants are not im-
mediately exercisable or if the market price of the underlying shares is
presently substantially below the exercise price under the warrants?"
Security Exemptions
Exemptions under the Securities Law are either securities exemp-
tions or transaction exemptions. A security is exempt if issued or guar-
anteed by governmental bodies," domestic non-profit corporations,"
banks or corporations which are federal instrumentalities and subject
to federal regulation,"° businesses in operation for more than the preced-
ing five years and having specified average annual net earnings,- federal
savings and loan associations or other savings and loan associations auth-
orized to do business in Colorado," and businesses continuously in oper-
ation in Colorado for more than twenty years if the security is secured
by a first mortgage on Colorado real estate. " There are further exemp-
tions for any securities of issuers having outstanding securities listed on
the New York, American, Midwest and Pacific Coast stock exchanges7,
and, under certain conditions, for any securities secured by mortgages
on agricultural lands and urban real estate, excluding oil, gas or mining
"6 To a limited extent, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 125-1-15(17) (Supp. 1957) answers ques-
tions relating to convertible securities and wsrrants by exempting from the Securities
Law certain rights offerings to existing security holders.
07For a general discussion of questions raised in this paragraph and how they
were handled under the Uniform Securities Act, see Loss and Cowett, Blue Sky Law
343-348 (1958).
00Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 125-1-15(2) and -(3) (Supp. 1957).
6 Id. § 125-1-15(2).
70 Id. § 125-1-15(4).
7,1 Id. § 125-1-15(5).
72 Id. § 125-1-15(6).
78 Ibid.




property or leases." Commercial paper maturing not more than twelve
months from date of issue is exempt if issued within three months from
such date and payable solely in cash."6 Investment contracts issued in
connection with employee benefit plans are exempt if the commissioner
is notified in writing thirty days before inception of the plan." Se-
curities of public utilities subject to regulation or supervision as to issue
of securities by public service commissions or other similar federal or
state regulative bodies are also exempt.6
Transaction Exemptions
Other exemptions designated as "security" exemptions are, more
accurately, transaction exemptions. The transaction exemptions include
securities sold at judicial and similar sales,"M by or for the account of a
pledgee or mortgagee,8" in isolated transactions by the owner, 8 trans-
actions not involving any public offering,8" certain pre-organization
transactions, " certain rights offerings to existing security holders," and
sales to certain institutional investors. 5
Probably the most important of the transactioji exemptions is that
for a "security sold or offered for sale in an isolated transaction by the
owner thereof, or by his representative for the owner's account," which
permits ordinary day-to-day selling and buying or trading of securities.
Of most importance to issuers generally is the exemption for transactions
"not involving any public offering." In this connection, the statutory
provisions summarized above as to when a security is deemed to be
offered to the public are applicable. Unlike the comparable exemption
under the Securities Act of 1933," the exemption is not limited to trans-
actions by issuers but also is available for transactions by other persons.
75 Id. § 125-1-15(8).
76 Id. § 125-1-15(9).
7 Id. § 125-1-15(10).
78 Id. § 125-1-15(15).
79 Id. § 125-1:-15(11).80 Id. § 125-1-15(12).
81 Id. 125-1-15(13).
82 Id. § 125-1-15(14).
63 Id. § 125-1-15(16).
64 Id. § 125-1-15(17).
85 Id. § 125-1-15(18).
86 48 Stat. 77, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1934), as amended, 68 Stat. 684,
15 U.S.C.A. § 77d(1) (Supp. 1957). Note, however, that the same section of the Secu-
rities Act of 1933 also exempts transactions by persons other than issuers, under-
writers or dealers.
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Availability of the exemption applicable to sales by pledgees hinges
on whether the sale is "in the ordinary course of business to liquidate a
bona fide debt" and whether the security was pledged "in good faith as
security for such debt.
7
Section 125-1-15 (16) exempts sales of a "pre-organization certifi-
cate or subscription" if "No commission or other remuneration is paid
or given directly or indirectly for soliciting any prospective subscriber;
the number of subscribers does not exceed ten; and no payment is made
to any subscriber." Presumably a pre-incorporation "subscription" need
not be evidenced by a writing or document and can be entirely oral."
Section 125-1-15 (17) " exempts a "transaction pursuant to an offer
to existing security holders of the issuer, including persons who at the
time of the transactions are holders of convertible securities, non-trans-
ferable warrants, or transferable warrants exercisable within not more
than 90 days of their issuance, if: No commission or other remuneration
(other than a standby commission) " is paid or given directly or in-
directly for soliciting any security holder in this state; or the issuer first
87Colo. Rev. Stat. § 125-1-15(12) (Supp. 1957).
"Colo. Rev. Stat. (Supp. 1957).
81 At least that is true under the Securities Act of 1933. See Loss, Securities Regu-
lation 301 (1951 with 1955 Supp.).
90 Colo. Rev. Stat. (Supp. 1957).
91 The official comment to § 402(b)(11) of the Uniform Act states (9C U.L.A. 133
(1957)): "The reference to a 'standby' commission . . . is designed to permit payment
to an underwriter for his risk and services in connection with his commitment to
take down any portion of the offering which is not taken down by the security
holders."
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files a notice specifying the terms of the offer and the commissioner does
not by order disallow the exemption within the next five full business
days." The provision is taken from the UniforhT Act. " The adminis-
trative discretion to disallow theexemption would appear to imply that
the commissioner may- determine from the notice filed whether the ex-
emption appears to be-available and order accordingly.
- Burden of Proof
The person claiming any exemption under the Securities Law has
the burden of proving its availability. "' In this connection, Rule 15 of
the Rules and Regulations adopted by the Colorado Division of Se-
curities on May 12, 1958, requires every 'issuer or dealer proposing to
make an offering believed to be exempt to submit to the Division of Se-
curities the facts tending to establish the exemptioi! and obtain a ruling
thereon from the securities commissioner.
NON-ISSuER TRANSACTIONS
The Securities Law is ambiguou in important respects in regard to
transactions not involving the issuer. Hypothetical examples will best
present or suggest some of the basic problems. In the following dis-
cussion, bear in mind that the registration requirements are .all-inclusive
and make it unlawful for "any person". to offer or sell "any security"
unless it is registered or an exemption is available."' And, in the ex-
amples given below, assume that no exemption is relevant except that
for a transaction "not involving any public offering"" or that for a
security sold or offered "in an isolated transaction by the owner.""
Example (1). Able offers or sells to Baker, Able's 1,000 shares of X
Corporation, which has 150,000 shares outstanding, its only outstanding
security. Able does not advertise or make any public solicitation. As-
suming there are no other material facts, must the shares be registered?
No. Both the private offering and isolated transaction exemptions are
available.
92 9C U.L.A. 130 (1957) (§ 402(b) (11) of Unif. Act).
13Colo. Rev. Stat. § 125-1-15(19) (Supp. 1957).
9, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 125-1-4 (Supp. 1957).
95 Id. § 125-1-15(14).
06 Id. § 125-1-15(13).
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Example (2). In example (1) , suppose, Able offers the shares by
advertising them for sale in a newspaper. .lnunediately thereafter he
sells 500 shares each to Baker and Charlie. Is the result the same?
Perhaps. Under section 125-1-16"7 the shares are deemed to have been
offered to the general public and thle exemption for tl'ansactions ",not
involving a public offering" cannot be available. But is this within the
purview of the isolated transaction exemption? An extremely literal
reading of the statute requires a negative answer. A sale to Baker and
a sale to Charlie are separate transactions. The two transactions are
substantially contemporaneous. Consequentl.y there is no security sold
in "an isolated transaction" as required by the statute. The strict inter-
pretation of the word "isolated" cannot be dismissed perfunictorily as"technical" or "unrealistic." Similar exemptions tend to be narrowly
construed in other states."
But there is a further problen. Under section 125-1-7, " all regis-
tration statements must be signed by the issuer, its directors and principal
officers. Unless Able controls the issuer, it is an impossibility, as a
practical matter, for hint to cause the shares to be registered. This fact
alone reasonably would appear to require not only a more liberal inter-
)retation of the word "isolated" but also, in effect, a complete exemption
from the Securities Law of all Able's transactions in securities of X Cor-
poration, regardless of the number of Able's purchasers. (Ve assume,
of course, that Able's transactions do not represent a subterfuge for
evasion of the statute, e.g., Able acts nerely as a conduit for distribution
of securities by an issuer.) This conclusion requires, however, that we
completely ignore the word "isolated" in the statutory exemption when-
ever the owner of securities is in no position to comapel the issuer to file
a registration statement. ' "'
Upon taking into account that isolated triansactions can and have
been strictly interpreted and that a liberal interpretation might read the
critical word completely out of the statute, the attorney advising Able
well might hesitate before giving a firm opinion that registration is not
required.
Example (3) . Assume the same facts as in example (2) except that
Able is president, a director and majority stockholder of X Corporation.
As the foregoing discussion indicates, there is much more reason in this
case to construe any possible isolated transaction exemption strictly since
Able can compel the issuer to file a registration statement. In view of
-- Colo. Rev. Stat. (Supp. 1957).
9S In Kneeland v. Emerton, 280 ',\ass. 371, 389. 183 N.E. 155, 163 (1932) (civil action
based on violation of blue sky law; defense: statute exempted "any isolated sale . . .
by the owner . . . not being made in repeated and suc'cessive transactions of a like
character''), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court stated: "We think two sales
of securities, made one after the other within a period of such reasonable time as to
indicate that one general purpose actuates the vendor and that the sales promote the
same aim and are not so detached and separated as to form no part of a single plan,
would be 'repeated and successive transactions.' " The -Massachusetts rule was quoted
and followed *n Gales v. -Weldon, 282 S.V.2d 522, 526 (Mo. 1955). Cf. Ersted v. Howry
Co., 68 S.D. il1, 299 N.W. 66 (1941). N.D. Laws 1951, S.B. No. IS6. § 6 specifically
limits the "isolated sale" exemption to three sales within a 12-month period. See
also CCH Blue Sky L, Rep. V1 2101.
99 Colo. Rev. Stat. (Supp. 1957).
100 This result is reached under the Federal Securities Act of 1933 by virtue of
the exemption under the first clause of § 4(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1952), for trans-
actions by "any person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer." tn this con-
nection, note that the term "underwriter" is defined in § 2(11), id. § 77b(l1), to
include persons purchasing with a view to distribution from "any person directly or
indirectly controlling or controlled by the issuer, or any person under direct or
indirect common control with the issuer."
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the wording of the isolated transaction exemption and in the light of
interpretation of similar exemptions elsewhere, Able may be legally
required to register his securities. The probability of that result in.
creases rapidly as purchasers in addition to Baker and Charlie are added
to the example. But even so, is not that result incongruous, especially in
the absence of explicit statutory language, judicial decision or adminis-
trative rules covering the situation posed? Only 1,000 shares are involved,
representing less than 1% of the outstanding securities of X Corporation.
It is one thing to say the Securities Law requires issuers to register large
blocks of securities publicly offered; it is quite another to require regis-
tration each time a relatively inconsequential public offering is made
by an individual controlling the issuer or, a fortiori, under the
facts of example (2). In the latter situations no wholesale injury to
public investors is likely to result, and it is entirely reasonable to suppose
that the statute was not intended to apply.'
The "practical" approach in both examples (2) and (3) is to con-
tact the securities commissioner to obtain, at least informally, his prior
assent to or acquiescence in an offering without registration. But even
if that be done, possible civil liability still hovers in the background.
101 Cf. Ira Haupt & Co., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. 3845 (1946) (SEC administrative pro-
ceeding against broker) involving a secondary distribution of a large block of secu-
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Example (4). Assume that Able offers 100,000 shares of his X
Corporation stock by advertising them for sale in a newspaper and that
as a result sales are made to approximately 100 public buyers; otherwise
the facts are the same as in example (3). X Corporation in this example
well might be a closely held corporation originally organized by Able
years ago, and Able may now wish to retire from business under circum-
stances in which other parties in interest lack funds to buy him out. It
is fairly clear that Able must register the shares. Whatever is involved,
there clearly is a public offering and the transactions hardly could be
considered isolated. There is the further consideration, so far as public
investors are concerned, that there is involved a distribution of securities
substantially equivalent to a public offering of 100,000 shares by X
Corporation itself; and there is no apparent reason why investors should
be denied protection under the Securities Law merely because the offer-
ing is made by Able and not by X Corporation.
Example (5). Assume the same facts as in example (4) except that
Able does not advertise the shares. He contacts twenty persons in Colo-
rado, and some or all of the persons solicited purchase the entire block.
Able need not register, not because these are isolated transactions (they
are not) , but because of the exemption for transactions "not involving
any public offering." This result depends, however, on negative impli-
cation from section 125-1-16 (d) 02 stating that a security is deemed to
be offered to the public "WVThere the persons solicited in this state in any
calendar year by any other means to buy shall exceed twenty-five in
number." The statutory language that solicitation of twenty-five persons
or more makes an offering public does not necessarily imply, however,
that an offering to less than twenty-five is not public. A careful attorney
therefore would advise Able that the exemption relied on is not abso-
lutely clear-cut.
Example (6). The facts are the same as in example (5) except that
Able engages his securities broker to make the solicitations and pays
the broker a commission. In the opinion of the writer, registration is
required; but the opposite result would not be inconsistent with the sta-
tutory language. The employment of a securities broker and the pay-
ment of a commission are one of the prominent trappings of a public
offering; the broker's business is retailing securities and he holds him-
self out as offering securities to the public generally. Clearly any nega-
102 Colo. Rev. Stat. (Supp. 1957).
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tive implication from the language of section 125-1-16 (d) is considerably
weaker than in example (5). Other factors, such as whether the pur-
chasers had sufficient knowledge of X Corporation and its securities to
have eliminated any practical necessity for them to have the benefit of
the disclosures provided by the Securities Law, well might be decisive
under these facts.1°3
RULES AND REGULATIONS
Under section 125-1-11 of the Colorado Revised Statutes,' the Com-
missioner of Securities is authorized "to make all necessary rules and
regulations required to carry this article into effect." Ostensibly entirely
under that authority, which is limited to the Securities Law, the Colorado
Securities Comnissioner on May 12, 1958, adopted thirty rules.'
The Rules go far beyond the scope of the Securities Law and encompass
dealers, salesmen, net capital requirements, and other matters clearly
relating only to the Fraudulent Practice Law."' ° The Rules supersede
all prior rules and regulations.
Rules Relating to Forins and Filing Requirements
Rule I prescribes that Form S-1 shall be used in registering securi-
ties by qualification, and Form S-la shall be used in registering securities
by coordination. Form S-la, as would be expected, is very simple, re-
quiring only the filling in of basic information as to the issuer, the
securities to be offered and the dealer making the offering in Colorado.
The form need be accompanied only by a power of attorney for service
of process upon the securities commissioner and one copy of the federal
registration statement without exhibits, unless exhibits are specifically
requested by the commissioner.
Form S-1 is considerably more detailed and, in general, requires
furnishing of the information specified in section 125-1-6 of the Colo-
-o Under the Securities Act of 1933 it is clear that an offering to even an insub-
stantial number of offerees can be "public" if the offerees are not persons who,
because of adequate knowledge of the issuer and its securities, "are shown to be
able to fend for themselves." S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124-125 (1953).
See also Loss, Securities Regulation 394-400 (1951), 185-187 (Supp. 1955).
104 Supp. 1957.
'o" The Rules are not generally published. Copies may be obtained from the
Division of Securities, Department of Law, Denver, Colorado. in all probability, they
will appear in due course in CCHI Blue Sky L. Rep.
06 Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 125-2-1 to -15 (Supp. 1957). The Fraudulent Practice Law
contains no general grant of rule making power but does explicitly authorize the
making of rules for certain specific purposes, e.g., prescription of financial reports
to be filed by dealers (id. § 125-2-3(8)).
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rado Revised Statutes." 7 Rule 3 requires that every Form S-I also be
accompanied by appropriate balance sheet and profit and loss informa-
tion; statement of dividends paid in the preceding three years and source
thereof; analysis of surplus if type and source of surplus are not apparent
from the surplus account; copies of material contracts, leases, patents,
etc.; copies of advertisements and sales literature to be used in con-
nection with the offering; copies of declaration of trust or articles of
incorporation as appropriate; and, if requested, copies of the resolution
authorizing issuance of securities and specimen copies of securities.
Under Rule 4, issuers organized "for the purpose of engaging pri-
marily in the exploration, development, or exploitation of mineral de-
posits other than oil and gas," if filing on Form S-1, must also submit,
as to all claims acquired or to be acquired and intended to be explored,
developed or operated with public funds, a survey certificate, report of
qualified mining engineer or geologist, information as to adverse interests
in unpatented claims, title opinions, copies of locuments of title to
mining property and contracts material thereto. Under Rule 5, issuers"organized for the purpose of acquiring royalties or interests in mineral
rights or leases with funds obtained from investors" must also file, prior
to acquisition of any such royalty or interest involving expenditure of
substantial capital contributed by public investors, a valuation report as
to the royalty or interest to be acquired. The latter requirement sur-
vives effectiveness of registration.
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Rules Implementing Disclosure Requirements
The most important of the Rules under this heading is Rule 16,
which requires that an offering circular be used in connection with
registered offerings and that each subscription agreement contain a
statement by the purchaser that he has received and read a copy of the
offering circular.
Prior to Rule 16, the Colorado regulatory system was indeed
anomalous in adopting a basic philosophy of disclosure of material
facts without affirmatively requiring that those facts be communicated to
prospective purchasers. Purchasers could, of course, always secure copies
of the filings made with the securities commissioner and had the benefit
of the civil liability provision that a purchaser would be deemed to
have relied only on statements made in that filing.' But the prospective
purchaser who, at his own trouble and expense examines a blue sky
filing prior to making his investment decision is a rare animal indeed.
If regulation by disclosure is to be effective, the disclosure to the pur-
chaser must take place before he parts with his money or otherwise
"gets on the hook." Rule 16 thus makes a substantial contribution to
effectuating the basic policy and purposes of the Securities Law.
The Rule specifies in considerable detail the form and content of
the offering circular to be used. In this respect, it is modeled upon and
closely follows Regulation A".. under the Securities Act of 1933 and,
to that extent, is a further significant step toward federal-state coordi-
nation. The offering circular must provide material details as to the
securities to be offered; the issuer or other person on whose behalf the
offering is made; the terms conditions and underwriting arrangements
pertaining to the offering; the purposes for which proceeds are to be
used; and the interests of promoters, insiders and underwriters in the
issuer and and the offering. In addition, there are specific requirements
for additional information as to mining issuers and oil and gas issuers.
Issuers engaged in other businesses must set forth information as to
their business, market, operating history and properties. The financial
information required to be filed under the Securities Law also must
be included in the offering circular, and all offering circulars are
subject to the general requirement that they disclose "all material facts
affecting the sale of the securities."
Rule 12 requires that issuers offering two or more classes of their
own securities in a "package offering" place a stated price on each
security. Rule 10 requires that material changes affecting the issuer and
its securities occurring after the effective date of a registration statement
be reported promptly in writing to the securities commissioner.
Rules Imposing Merit Requirements
After Colorado for thirty-five years had espoused a system of securi-
ties registration of which the official philosophy had been, at least osten-
sibly, purely one of requiring disclosure of all material facts relating
to public offerings, the Rules of May 12, 1958, without antecedent
fanfare by way of legislation amendatory of the Securities Law, in
1o8 See Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 125-1-9 and -10 (1953).
109 17 C.F.R. §§ 230, 251-62 (Supp. 1957), CCH Sec. I,. Rep. I[ 4256 and ff 7&27.
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certain important respects formally enunciated merit requirements appli-
cable to offerings sought to be registered.
The main pertinent Rules are short and quoted in full:
"17. The commission to dealers and underwriters on
speculative issues shall not exceed 20%, including all expenses
of the issue.
"18. No commission shall be allowed any officer or director
of an issuer-dealer.
"19. Non-voting stock offered as the sole security of an issue
shall not be allowed.
"20. All installment sales contracts for the sale of securities
of a speculative venture shall provide a minimum down pay-
ment of 25% in cash, the balance payable within one year.
The underwriting commission charged shall be taken from each
initial down payment. A so-called 'front-end load' on sales
commission will not be approved, nor forfeitures upon default.
"23. No portion of an issue may be purchased by an under-
writer for an issuer for anything less than full cash consider-
ation, and such shares may not be re-sold by the underwriter
during the period of the public offering.
"24. No options or warrants may be exercised by an under-
writer for an issuer for a period of one year after commence-
ment of the public offering.
"27. The so-called 'Vheel of Fortune' promotions will not
be registered, as it is determined by this rule to be in the public
interest that such promotions shall provide for the establishment
of only one subsidiary by a holding company at one time,
and during one offering.
"29. No offering will be registered wherein there is more
than 50% promotional stock."
The Colorado Securities Commissioner apparently found, in the
language of the statutory grant of rule-making power, that the Rules
quoted are among the "necessary rules and regulations required to carry
this article into effect." As previously noted, the Securities Law con-
tains no merit requirements or standards as are commonly found in
other blue sky laws. Rather, if statutory language is any indication, the
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statutory object and purpose is entirely one of securing disclosure of
all material facts relating to offers and sales of securities subject to
the registration requirements. In what sense the foregoing Rules are
"necessary" to achieve that object and purpose or "to carry this article
into effect" requires considerable imagination. Any implication of pos-
sible statutory authority for the Rules would appear to have to rest
on the premise that the Rules involve fraudulent financing devices
which are misleading per se and as to which no amount of disclosure
will make possible an informed decision by public investors. But just how
the public investor necessarily will be misled, assuming he is fully in-
formed of all material facts relating to for example, an offering "wherein
there is more than 50% promotional stock" is anything but obvious.
Aside from questions of lack of statutory authority, the merit Rules
present other problems. In Rule 27, for example, what is a "so-called
'Wheel of Fortune' promotion"? And, if such are not to be registered,
what is the meaning and effect of the further provision that it is de-
termined to be in the public interest that "such promotions" shall pro-
vide for the establishment of only one subsidiary by a holding company
at one time and during one offering?
The Rules just considered might be dismissed with the observation
that either they are the result of "bull-in-the-bucket-shop."' rule making
or else represent a forceful administrative effort, despite statutory de-
ficiencies, to protect Colorado citizens from unscrupulous promoters.
Choice of characterization depends upon one's point of view and whose
ox is being gored. In this connection, the incumbent securities commis-
sioner informally has stated to the author that the Rules above referred
to were adopted in order to deal immediately with flagrant violations
of law which required prompt attention and that the Rules have achieved
the result intended. But the existence in a system of securities regulation
of administrative rules whose statutory authority is open to very sub-
stantial question presents a serious aspect often not present in other
areas of governmental regulation. The issuer proposing to make a public
offering is, as a practical matter, in no position to question in the courts
a state administrator's authority to issue a doubtful regulation." ' "The
managers of the company are interested in obtaining capital, not in
litigating nice legal questions. .. . Hence the managers will exercise their
110 See Editorial, The Denver Post, June 23, 1958, p. 14, col. 1 and 2.
S11 Thirty-five years of the Securities Law have resulted in no significant reported
decisions thereunder.
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inalienable privilege to damn the administrator-in the privacy of their
offices, of course-and either change their offering to satisfy the admini-
strator's objections or forget about financing in his state."".
2
CONCLUSION
The Colorado Securities Law is a small segment of a nationwide
collocation of federal and state systems of securities registration diverse
in matters of detail as well as underlying policies. The Colorado legis-
lators early adopted as a basic policy for this state the disclosure, as
distinguished from the regulatory, approach to securities registration.
To a significant extent, the Colorado legislation has been coordinated
with the Federal Securities Act of 1933. Despite several amendments
however, the Securities Law leaves unanswered many questions of con-
siderable practicable importance, e.g., how do the registration require-
ments apply to secondary distributions and problems associated with
convertible securities, warrants, and options. The present administrative
regulations under the statute in important respects, such as in requiring
use of offering circulars, contribute substantially to effectuating the
basic policies of the act. To the extent such regulations prescribe merit
requirements for registered offerings, however, they go far beyond any
statutory authority, express or implied.
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